PAUL A. BONIN, Judge.

In his seventh amending and supplemental petition, Dana Johno, the appellant, asserted three claims against Scottsdale Insurance Company, the appellee. Only one of those claims, however, is before us on this appeal. Mr. Johno, as the purported assignee of Leon Duplessis & Sons, Inc., ("Duplessis") asserts a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against Scottsdale. Scottsdale filed a partial peremptory exception of no right of action to this specific claim. The trial judge sustained the partial exception and dismissed this claim of Mr. Johno.

In support of the trial judge's ruling, Scottsdale argues that the Release executed between Mr. Johno and Duplessis, from which the purported assignment of the claim is derived, is unambiguous and does not assign any bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against Scottsdale. We have reviewed the Release, which of course is a contract between the parties, de novo and conclude as a matter of law that Duplessis did not therein assign Mr. Johno its bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against Scottsdale. Accordingly, we affirm the trial judge's sustaining the partial exception and dismissing the specific claim for bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against Scottsdale.

We explain our decision below.

I

A

Dana Johno owned a rental home, damaged during Hurricane Katrina in 2005, which according to him was demolished without his consent. Leon Duplessis & Sons, Inc. had a contract with Plaquemines Parish Government for demolition and debris removal. In addition to suing them, Mr. Johno also sued two subcontractors, Hard Rock Construction and Pro Tree Services as well as their insurer, Scottsdale Insurance Company.

During the course of the litigation, Mr. Johno settled with Duplessis and Plaquemines Parish. He learned around the time of the settlement that Scottsdale, who allegedly insured Duplessis, refused to participate in settlement negotiations.

As part of his settlement with Duplessis, Mr. Johno and Duplessis executed a Release. The full title of the Release is "Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release." Additional parties and signatories to the Release are Plaquemines Parish and The Hanover Insurance Company. The Release generally provided for payment to Mr. Johno by Duplessis, Plaquemines Parish and Hanover and his release of "any and all claims" he may have against them.1 The term "claims" is comprehensively defined in the Release. The Release also provided an assignment to Mr. Johno of some but not all of Duplessis' "contractual rights" against Hard Rock and Scottsdale.

Upon the completion of the execution of the Release, Mr. Johno filed his seventh amending and supplemental petition. In that petition, he advanced three claims against Scottsdale. One of the claims he advanced was that Scottsdale was liable to him personally for its bad-faith failure to settle his own claim. The trial judge sustained a partial peremptory exception of no cause of action as to that claim and dismissed it.2 Mr. Johno has not assigned error to that ruling and the issue presented by the exception is not before us. Another of the claims advanced by Mr. Johno against Scottsdale is as the assignee of Duplessis (by virtue of the Release) for Duplessis' indemnity claim under the policy of insurance. Scottsdale has not challenged Mr. Johno's right to assert Duplessis' indemnity claim and thus this claim too is not before us.

B

The third claim advanced is, however, before us on our review of the sustained partial exception of no right of action. When, as here, we are presented with an exception of no right of action under La. C.C.P. art. 927 A(6), we assume for the purposes of deciding the exception that the petition states a valid cause of action. See J-W Power Co. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Revenue, 10-1598, p. 7 (La. 3/15/11), 59 So.3d 1234, 1239; Louisiana Paddlewheels v. Louisiana Riverboat Gaming Com'n, 646 So.2d 885, 888 (La. 1984). This claim, a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, arises under La. R.S. 22:1973.3 A cause of action for a bad-faith failure-to-settle under Section 1973 is only available to Mr. Johno if he is advancing Duplessis' claim as assigned to him. See Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 14-1921, p. 6 (La.5/5/15), 169 So.3d 328, 333.

In the trial court, Scottsdale excepted to Mr. Johno's right to assert Duplessis' bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against it on two distinct grounds. First, Scottsdale contended that because such bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, which it characterizes as a strictly personal right, was not first asserted by Duplessis in a lawsuit before any assignment, the claim was not assignable and thus Mr. Johno could not be the assignee. And, second, Scottsdale contended that the Release itself unambiguously did not grant any assignment of Duplessis' bad-faith failure-to-settle claim even if it could be assigned.

The trial judge accepted Scottsdale's first contention and did not reach its second. He sustained the partial exception and dismissed the bad-faith failure-to-settle claim advanced by Mr. Johno. Mr. Johno appealed the ruling.4 We review the ruling de novo. See Caceras v. Work, 12-1097, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/27/13), 110 So.3d 275, 278.

We pause to emphasize that it is the ruling itself, and not the trial judge's stated reasons for his ruling, that we are reviewing for correctness. See Wooley v. Lucksinger, 09-0571, 09-0584, 09-0585, 09-0586, pp. 77-78 (La.4/1/11), 61 So.3d 507, 572 (Because reasons for judgment form no part of a judgment and we review judgments, "[j]udgments are often upheld on appeal for reasons different from those assigned by the district judges."). And, because Scottsdale was the prevailing party in the trial court, it is not limited to the reasons given by the trial judge in support of its position but may rely on any argument supported by the record. See La. C.C.P. art. 2133 B ("A party who does not seek modification, revision, or reversal of a judgment in an appellate court ... may assert, in support of the judgment, any argument supported by the record, although he has not appealed, answered the appeal, or applied for supervisory writs."); Cusimano v. Port Esplanade Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 10-0477, p. 3 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/12/11), 55 So.3d 931, 935.

Because we agree with Scottsdale that the Release is unambiguous, as we discuss in Part II, post, and that Duplessis does not assign its bad-faith failure-to-settle claim against Scottsdale to Mr. Johno, we conclude that the ruling is correct and thus need not further consider the basis on which the trial judge based his ruling.

II

The Release is the law between Mr. Johno and Duplessis. See La. Civil Code art.1983. "When the words of a contract are clear and explicit and lead to no absurd consequences, no further interpretation may be made in search of the parties' intent." La. Civil Code art. 2046. And "[w]hen a contract can be construed from the four corners of the instrument without looking to extrinsic evidence, the question of contractual interpretation is answered as a matter of law." Sims v. Mulhearn Funeral Home, Inc., 07-0054 p. 10 (La.5/22/07), 956 So.2d 583, 590; Louisiana Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 93-0911 p. 7 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 759, 764 ("The determination of whether a contract is clear or ambiguous is a question of law."). The interpretation of this contract, then, is a question of law. Wooley, p. 56, 61 So.3d at 558.

Here, Mr. Johno argues that there is a broad assignment of rights, which although it admittedly does not expressly specify the assignment of the bad-faith failure-to-settle claim is sufficiently broad to include it. And, it is true, that the assignment of rights portion of the Release, if read in isolation from the remainder of the Release, would appear to be broad and nearly all-encompassing. But, of course, we do not read any single contractual provision in isolation. See La. Civil Code art. 2050 ("Each provision in a contract must be interpreted in light of the other provisions so that each is given the meaning suggested by the contract as a whole.").

The assignment of rights portion of the Release is set forth below (capitalized terms are those which the Release specifically defines in its definitions portion):

We have emphasized at the outset the provisions "all contractual rights," which include "indemnity claims" as well as "any additional rights" under "the HARDROCK CONTRACT" so as to contrast them with Mr. Johno's argument that these contractual rights encompass a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim. It is settled that a bad-faith failure-to-settle claim arises not from the contract of insurance itself but rather from an insurer's violation of its statutory duties under La. R.S. 22:1973. See Wegener v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 10-0810, p. 12 (La. 3/15/11), 60 So.3d 1220, 1229; Durio v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 11-0084, p. 18 (La. 10/25/11), 74 So.3d 1159, 1170 (The duties of an insurer under the statute "are separate and distinct from its duties under the insurance contract."). And we detect no provision in the plain words of the assignment of rights which purports to assign the statutory (as opposed to contractual) claim.

The indemnity claim, clearly assigned to Mr. Johno, and the obligation-to-defend claim (defense costs), clearly reserved by Duplessis, are, on the other hand, quintessential claims arising from the contract of insurance, especially when contractual liability is assumed. See, e.g., Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Government, 04-1459, pp. 18-19 (La. 4/12/05), 907 So.2d 37, 51-52. Barton Protective Services, Inc. v. Coverx Corp., 615 So.2d 438, 441-442 (La.App. 4th Cir.1993).

We do not, and cannot, assume that the absence of an explicit assignment of its bad-faith failure-to-settle claim by Duplessis should be construed as an ambiguity in the Release. Elsewhere (in the definitions section) in the Release, the terms "CLAIM" or "CLAIMS" are defined. And, importantly, these terms as defined in the contract itself are only used in the assignment of rights provision with the modifier "indemnity." As defined in the Release, a "CLAIM" or "CLAIMS" includes demands or causes of action whether arising out of tort, contract, statute, regulation, or otherwise, including contractual claims, extracontractual claims, claims for indemnity, claims for insurance coverage, and claims for violation of any code, statute, including but not limited to claims under La. R.S. 22:1973 (formerly 22:1220), statutory or contractual penalties, and bad faith damages.5

We should note that Mr. Johno released Duplessis from all his "claims" against it. But Duplessis in the Release simply did not assign its "claims" against Scottsdale to Mr. Johno. Duplessis only assigned some of its contractual rights, primarily its (contractual) right to seek indemnity from its insurer for the settlement it paid to Mr. Johno.

Thus, as defined by the contract itself, a "claim" includes "contractual rights" such as a "claim for indemnity" or a claim for costs of defense, but the terms "claim" and "contractual rights" are not thereby interchangeable. And, as the Release makes plain, the parties were amply able to clearly express that among the claims for which Mr. Johno was releasing Duplessis and Hanover was the bad-faith claim under Section 1973. Yet nowhere in the Release, and certainly not in its assignment of rights portion, is there any mention of assigning such comparable claims that Duplessis may have against Scottsdale.

Therefore, we find that the Release, which is the contract between Mr. Johno and Scottsdale, is unambiguous and must be enforced as written. Because Mr. Johno is not the assignee of Duplessis' bad-faith failure-to-settle claim under Section 1973 against Scottsdale, he may not advance or exercise Duplessis' right of action. See Kelly, 14-1921, p. 6, 169 So.3d at 333. And, on that account, the trial judge was correct in sustaining Scottsdale's partial exception of no right of action.

DECREE

The ruling sustaining the partial exception of no right of action filed by Scottsdale Insurance Company, dismissing Dana Johno's bad-faith failure-to-settle claim, is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

TOBIAS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

BAGNERIS, J., dissents.

TOBIAS, J., dissents and assigns reasons.

The plaintiff/appellant, Dana Johno ("Mr. Johno"), appeals a judgment that granted a partial peremptory exception of no cause of action and a partial peremptory exception of no right of action filed by the defendant/appellee, Scottsdale Insurance Company ("Scottsdale"). Mr. Johno, however, does not assign as error that part of the judgment that granted the partial exception of no cause of action, and thus I pretermit a discussion of the correctness of that portion of the judgment. Finding that our procedural law does not recognize a partial exception of no right of action and for the reasons that follow, I would convert the appeal of Mr. Johno to a writ application for supervisory review, grant the writ application, vacate the judgment insofar as it granted the partial exception of no right of action, and remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

The trial court set forth the facts in its reasons for judgment, which for the purposes hereof I adopt:

In response to the seventh supplemental and amending petition, Scottsdale filed partial peremptory exceptions of no cause of action and of no right of action.

First, Scottsdale argued that Mr. Johno does not have a [direct] cause of action against it for bad faith damages under La. R.S. 22:19731 (formerly La. R.S. 22:1220) for its alleged failure to settle his claims because he was not a party to the insurance contract between Scottsdale and its additional insured, Duplessis.

Second, Scottsdale argued that an unexercised right to file a lawsuit is not assignable; thus that claim should be dismissed as well.

After briefing and oral argument, the trial court granted both of Scottsdale's partial exceptions and dismissed those two claims asserted by the plaintiff with prejudice.2 It did not, however, dismiss Scottsdale from the litigation, as the plaintiff has asserted other issues against Scottsdale in this lawsuit.

I find that the judgment rendered by the court was improperly designated as final and immediately appealable under La. C.C.P. art.1915.

Simply put, the portion of the judgment that granted the partial exception of no right of action should not have been designated as "final" and immediately appealable as it does not meet the criteria described in La. C.C.P. art. 1915. See R.J. Messinger, Inc. v. Rosenblum, 04-1664 (La.3/2/05), 894 So.2d 1113. This court does, however, have the authority to convert the appellant's appeal to an application for a supervisory writ of review, and thereby exercise our constitutional supervisory jurisdiction. This I would do in this case because I find no such procedural device exists in our law as a partial peremptory exception of no right of action. Shinew v. Luciano Refrigerated Transport, Inc., 96-2454, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/19/97), 706 So.2d 140, 141; Cenac Towing Co. v. Cenac, 413 So.2d 1351, 1352 (La.App. 1st Cir.1982); Poy v. Twin Oaks Nursing Home, Inc., 95-889, pp. 6-8 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/14/96), 671 So.2d 15, 18-19; see also In re Medical Review Panel Claim of Dunjee, 97-0451, 97-0452 (La. App. 4 Cir. 5/27/98), 715 So.2d 64. Either a person has a right of action or he does not. By Scottsdale's filing of a motion asserting a partial exception of no right of action, it confesses that Mr. Johno has a right of action on some other cause of action.3

I find Scottsdale's "partial" exception of no right of action was instead, and in fact, another exception of "no cause of action." As explained by the Supreme Court in Babineaux v. Pernie-Bailey Drilling Co., 261 La. 1080, 1095-97, 262 So.2d 328, 333-34 (La.1972):

See also Harvey v. Cole, 02-1704, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/03), 845 So.2d 591, 595 ("The exception of no right of action assumes that the petition states a valid cause of action for some person and questions whether the plaintiff in the particular case has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.")

Babineaux sets forth a bright-line rule of law from which the Louisiana Supreme Court has never intentionally deviated. I acknowledge that the Court and courts of appeal have from time-to-time said or found that a party had "no right of action," even utilizing the word "partial" in its discussion. However, a careful dissection of the issue before the courts in those cases is that they were using "right of action" to mean that the law afforded the party no claim, much like Scottsdale's proffered position in this case, that Mr. Johno has no direct claim for bad faith under La. R.S. 22:1973, a position with which I agree.

However, I do find that Mr. Johno has an interest in asserting that he was assigned Duplessis' La. R.S. 22:1973 claim by the Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release at issue. It is clear (undisputed) that Mr. Johno has an assignment of Duplessis' indemnity claims. In pertinent part, the Release states:

The definition of "claim" or "claims" is contained earlier in the settlement agreement. In the section entitled "DEFINITIONS," Paragraph 13 states in pertinent part:

In order to argue that an exception of no right of action applies in this case, Scottsdale would be conceding that an unexercised right to file a lawsuit may be assigned, but that Mr. Johno is not in the class of persons permitted to do so. Instead, Scottsdale's position is that an unexercised right to file a lawsuit may never be assigned. Like the inability of a third-party claimant to directly sue the defendant's insurer, this too questions whether the petition states a valid cause of action.

Thus, the issue in this case is whether an unexercised right to institute a lawsuit may be assigned. Although I pretermit a detailed discussion of that issue, reserving it for another day, I note that La. C.C. arts. 448, et seq., 1765, 1766, 1984, and 2642; King v. Illinois National Ins. Co., 08-1491 (La.4/3/09), 9 So.3d 780; and Kelly v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 14-1921(La.5/5/15), 169 So.3d 328, drive the issue, with King and Kelly taking inconsistent and irreconcilable positions on the issue4 and the Civil Code specifically answering the issue, agreeing with the dissent of Justice Kimball in King.

In the case at bar, Duplessis did not assert a bad faith claim against Scottsdale in a lawsuit; from my reading of the Release, it is unclear whether Duplessis' unexercised right to file a bad faith claim against Scottsdale was assigned to Mr. Johno. We as a panel are in disagreement as to exactly what, if anything, Duplessis transferred to Mr. Johno. This is best fleshed out in the trial court with evidence.5 Thus, I find it appropriate to convert Mr. Johno's appeal to an application for supervisory writ (because his appeal was filed within thirty days of the trial court's judgment on the exceptions),6 grant the writ application, vacate the trial court's judgment insofar as it granted the partial exception of no right of action and dismissed Scottsdale with prejudice.

Because (a) the trial court granted the partial exception of no right of action and dismissed some of Mr. Johno's claims with prejudice; (b) the trial court improperly determined an issue of law on a nonexistent asserted "partial" exception of no right of action;7 and (c) reasonable minds could conceive or perceive interpretations of the contract (the "Confidential Settlement Agreement and Release") at issue which may or may not have transferred to Mr. Johno the assignor's bad faith claims under La. R.S. 22:1973, I find it appropriate to covert the appeal of the appellant to a writ application.8

BAGNERIS, J., dissents.

I dissent for the reasons assigned by Judge TOBIAS.